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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 shook confidence in our nation’s
financial markets and illuminated shortcomings in corporate governance
and banking and securities regulation.1 Given this environment, the
Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection and Wall Street Reform Act (“DoddFrank”)2 was promulgated. On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama
signed Dodd-Frank into law,3 and while its changes were to become
effective one year later, the compliance date for many provisions has
been postponed.4 As of July 2, 2012, 221 Dodd-Frank rulemaking
requirement deadlines have passed, which represents nearly fifty-five
percent of the 398 total rulemaking requirements under Dodd-Frank,
and seventy-nine percent of the 280 rulemaking requirements with
specified deadlines. Of the 221 passed deadlines, 140, or sixty-three
percent, have been missed and 81, or thirty-seven percent, have been
met with finalized rules.5 That aside, the primary purposes of DoddFrank are “to promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to
end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices.”6 Spanning over 2,300 pages, Dodd-Frank is the most
comprehensive financial regulatory reform in the United States since the
Great Depression and affects nearly all aspects of the domestic financial

1

Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 389,
391–92 (2011).
2
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act Title
IV, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3
Id.
4
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act
Amendments
to
Investment
Advisers
Act
(June
22,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm. With respect to registration of
investment advisers under Title IV, i.e., those advisers who would have previously relied on
§203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act, compliance with registration was extended until
March 30, 2012.
5
Dodd-Frank Progress Report, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP 2 (July 2, 2012),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/8bc2b1c4-c800-45b1-83240381454f6ceb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b9462d4e-0be9-4eee-98290455bca61e9a/July2012_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf.
6
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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services industry.7
The hedge fund industry was not immune from scrutiny. Due in
large part to the fact that many individuals and institutions invest a
significant amount of assets in private funds, such as hedge funds and
private equity funds, Dodd-Frank purports to reign in this sector of the
financial services industry. This is primarily because prior to the
passage of Dodd-Frank, advisers who managed assets in private funds
were subject to little regulatory oversight. 8 This lack of oversight has
led critics to blame hedge funds for their role in the crisis, causing
hedge funds and their managers to become scapegoats for the problems
affecting many aspects of financial markets.9 While debate over the
most appropriate form of hedge fund regulation is far ranging, Congress
sought to raise standards and regulations for private funds with the
passage of Dodd-Frank.10 In effect, these new standards fill the
regulatory gap that previously existed by extending the registration
requirements under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers
Act”).11 Specifically, under Dodd-Frank, Congress enacted the Private
Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (“Title IV”).12 Title
IV generally expands the reporting requirements of private advisers. As
such, Title IV requires those advisers who fall within the definition of
“investment advisers”13 to register with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Commission”).14

7

Erich T. Schwartz, Charles F. Walker, & Colin D. Forbes, The Dodd-Frank Act:
Commentary and Insights SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER, & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES
(Jul.
12,
2010),
http://www.skadden.com/cimages/sitefile/skadden_insights_special_edition_doddfrank_act1.pdf.
8
Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 4.
9
Kaal, supra note 1, at 392-4.
10
See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH
CONG., BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION
ACT
(2010),
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_compreh
ensive_summary_Final.pdf.
11
Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 4. “The law also provides the
Commission with the ability to require the limited number of advisers to private funds that
will not have to register, to file reports about their business activities” with the Commission.
12
15 U.S.C.A. §80b-20.
13
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §203(b)(3) (1940) (defines investment advisers
who need not be registered).
14
Kaal, supra note 1, at 400.
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By requiring hedge fund and private equity advisers to register
with the Commission as investment advisers, Title IV effectively seeks
to end the “shadow” financial system.15 Many have claimed that a
disruption in the shadow banking system was a key component of the
subprime mortgage crisis, helping to substantially accelerate the ensuing
financial crisis. Private funds, including hedge funds, are one
component of the shadow banking system. Under Title IV, these
advisers will now be required to provide information about their trades
and portfolios necessary to assess systemic risk. 16 This data will then be
shared with the systemic risk regulator, and the Commission will report
to Congress annually on “how it uses this data to protect investors and
market integrity.”17 Furthermore, Dodd-Frank “reallocated regulatory
responsibility for certain mid-sized investment advisers to the state
securities authorities.”18 This shifting of oversight burden was done in
acknowledgement of the Commission’s limited examination resources,
while taking into consideration the new reporting responsibilities for
private fund advisers.19
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the implications of Title IV
under Dodd-Frank. Specifically, this Note will address whether
subjecting advisers to “private funds” (including hedge funds, private
equity funds, and other types of pooled investment vehicles excluded
from the definition of “investment company” under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (“Company Act”), as amended) to the
registration and reporting requirements of the Advisers Act will have
any substantial effects from a regulatory standpoint. An in-depth
analysis of the repeal of the broad “private adviser” exemption and the
narrower exemptions it was replaced with will be explored in greater
detail in an effort to determine whether Title IV will have any
meaningful and substantial impact on hedge fund advisers who
previously enjoyed the broad exemption from registration.

15

STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 10. “Shadow”
in terms of the fact that hedge funds were viewed as financial institutions operating behind
the scenes, in the shadows, and outside of the purview of the Commission.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 4.
19
Id.
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This Note argues that, although Title IV has been touted by many
as sweeping regulation of the hedge fund industry that will ultimately
expand federal and state government’s oversight of hedge funds and
other private funds,20 there is a lot less to Title IV than meets the eye.
Particularly troubling is the “family office” exemption, which has
potentially created a significant loophole that encompasses a large
fraction of the industry’s assets.21 When coupled with the other newly
created exemptions, the breadth and reach of Title IV quickly dissipates.
Because many private fund advisers previously chose to register with
the Commission, although not required to do so, and, in light of the
limited resources of the Commission, Title IV begins to look less
revolutionary than originally hoped, offering little by way of protection
for the investing public and increased transparency.
This Note begins in Part I with an overview of the Commission’s
regulatory landscape as it stands today, beginning with the Advisers Act
and Company Act. Part II introduces Title IV and the rule’s newly
created exemptions. Part III examines whether the venture capital fund
adviser and family office exemptions contained within Title IV begin to
swallow the rule. This section also includes a discussion of how some
hedge fund managers have recently restructured their funds, ultimately
affording themselves the opportunity to avoid the Commission’s
oversight. Part IV proposes a critical analysis of the implications Title
IV may have on the hedge fund industry, both for advisers required to
register and those able to avail themselves of one of the new
exemptions. While hedge funds have been maligned as key contributors
to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, Dodd-Frank’s Title IV does little in
the way of regulating the hedge fund industry, as many savvy
investment advisers may be able to avail themselves of one of the newly
created exemptions. As the compliance date of Title IV has now passed,
it remains uncertain whether Title IV’s amendments will be effective in
limiting systemic risk posed by the hedge fund industry.

20

Dodd-Frank Act: The Impact on Hedge Funds and Private Placements, SECURITIES
LAW PRACTICE CENTER (Sept. 20, 2011), http://seclawcenter.pli.edu/2010/07/14/dodd-frankact-the-impact-on-hedge-funds-and-private-funds.
21
Stephen Brown, Anthony Lynch, & Antti Petajisto, Hedge Funds after Dodd-Frank,
N.Y.U. LEONARD N. STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS (July 19, 2010),
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/07/hedge-funds-afterdoddfrank.html.
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I. THE COMMISSION’S PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE
PRIVATE FUND INVESTMEN ADVISERS
A. The 1940 Acts: The Investment Adviser and Investment
Company Acts
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression that then followed, Congress enacted the Securities Act of
1933.22 The primary objectives of the 1933 Act, often referred to as the
“Truth in Securities” law, “were to require that investors receive
financial and other significant information concerning securities being
offered for public sale,” while prohibiting “deceit, misrepresentations,
and other fraud in the sale of securities.”23 To further promote investor
confidence in the markets during a tumultuous time, Congress passed
the Advisers Act and the Company Act. The Advisers Act regulates
investment advisers, firms and sole practitioners, requiring those who
receive compensation for advising others about securities investments to
register with the Commission and conform to certain regulations
designed to protect investors.24 There are exceptions to registration,
such as the recently overturned Section 203(b)(3). Alternatively, the
Company Act regulates both the organization of companies, such as
“mutual funds, that engage in investing, reinvesting, and trading in
securities, and whose own securities are offered to the investing public,”
as well as what these companies may ultimately invest in. 25 In
regulating the individual funds, the Commission seeks to minimize
conflicts of interest.26

22

Congress also enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at this time. The
Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. (July 30, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
23
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. (June 27,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933.
24
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. (July 30, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
25
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. (June
27, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933.
26
Id.
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As mentioned, Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act,27 commonly
known as the “private adviser” exemption,28 exempted any adviser from
registration as an investment adviser provided that adviser had: “(i)
fewer than fifteen clients in the preceding twelve months; 29 (ii) did not
hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser; and (iii) did not
act as an investment adviser to a registered investment company or a
company that had elected to be a business development company.”30
Advisers specifically exempt under section 203(b)(3) were not subject
to reporting or recordkeeping requirements under the Advisers Act, and
as such, were not subject to examination by the Commission’s staff.31
In addition to the “private adviser” exemption under the Advisers
Act, the Company Act32 further insulated certain private funds from the
Commission’s oversight. Private funds, which include hedge funds,
private equity funds, and other types of pooled investment vehicles, are
excluded from the definition of “investment company” under the
Company Act.33 This specific exemption is found in both section 3(c)(1)
and/or section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act.34 Section 3(c)(1) is available
to a fund that does not publicly offer the securities it issues and has 100
27

15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2012).
Id.
29
See Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, Staff Report to the U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
30
Clients & Friends Memo: Hedge Fund Regulation Under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM, & TAFT LLP
(July 20, 2010), http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/072010_DF5.pdf.
31
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2012). Under section 204(a) of the Advisers Act, the
Commission has the authority to require an investment adviser to maintain records and
provide reports, as well as the authority to examine such adviser’s records, unless the
adviser is “specifically exempted” from the requirement to register pursuant to section
203(b) of the Advisers Act. Investment advisers that are exempt from registration in reliance
on other sections of the Advisers Act (such as sections 203(l) or 203(m)) are not
“specifically exempted” from the requirement to register pursuant to section 203(b), and
thus the Commission has authority under section 204(a) of the Advisers Act to require those
advisers to maintain records and provide reports and has authority to examine such advisers’
records.
32
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2012) (the term “investment company means any issuer
which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily in the business of investing,
reinvesting, or trading in securities.”). While the Advisers Act seeks to regulate the
individual investment adviser, the Company Act regulates the individual fund.
33
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012).
34
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(29) (2012). This section will now be amended to include in the
Advisers Act § 202(a)(29), which defines the term “private fund” as “an issuer that would
be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Company Act of 1940. . . but for
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(29) (2012).
28
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or fewer beneficial owners of its outstanding securities.35 A fund relying
on section 3(c)(7) cannot publicly offer the securities it issues and
generally must limit the owners of its outstanding securities to
“qualified purchasers.”36 Unlike the Advisers Act, the Company Act has
not changed as a result of Title IV or any other provisions within DoddFrank.
B. The Rise of Hedge Funds
During the first decade of this century, the United States saw rapid
growth in hedge funds, “fueled primarily by the increased interest of
institutional investors such as pension plans, endowments and
foundations seeking to diversify their portfolios with investments in
vehicles that feature absolute return strategies.”37 Triggered largely by
this growth in hedge fund assets, the Commission staff conducted a
study of hedge funds and their advisers in 2003.38 The United States
Commission Staff Report estimated that between “6,000 to 7,000 hedge
funds operat[ed] in the United States, managing approximately $600 to
$650 billion in assets.”39 The report predicted that in the five to ten
years that followed, hedge fund assets would exceed $1 trillion.40 While
the true size of the hedge fund sector has long been controversial, and
statistical sources differ regarding the precise measure of the total
number of hedge fund assets under management, analysts appear to
agree that the hedge fund sector has surpassed the $1 trillion prediction.
Conservative estimates have valued the industry at $1 trillion, 41 while
others value assets in single manager hedge funds at an all-time high of
$3.34 trillion.42 Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the hedge fund
35

Investment Company Act of 1940, §3(c)(1) (2012).
Id. at §3(c)(7).
37
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supra note 29.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. Sources differ on what a precise measure of the total number of hedge funds and
their respective assets under management are. Most agree that the baseline for assets under
management in hedge funds in the United States is $1 trillion, however some have predicted
that number may in fact be as high as $2.5 trillion in assets under management in the global
hedge fund industry. Tony Griffiths, 17th Biannual Assets Under Administration Survey:
Part
One
Single
Managers,
HFMWEEK.COM
(Nov.
2011),
http://www.citco.com/sites/default/files/downloads/HFM%20Week%20SMF%20AUA%20
Survey%20-%20November%202011.pdf.
42
Griffiths, supra note 41 (data is for the six months from May 1, 2011 to Oct. 31,
36
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industry has continued to see net inflows, even in the wake of the
financial crisis.43
Rapid growth in the hedge fund industry and the associated
increased role hedge funds began to play in the financial markets, along
with the inherent risk associated with return strategies they employ,
ultimately led to an increase in the Commission’s number of
enforcement cases for malfeasance by hedge fund advisers. 44 Upon
conclusion of the hedge fund study in 2003, the Commission recognized
that most hedge funds enjoyed a nearly complete lack of transparency,
as exemplified by the Commission’s “limited ability to obtain basic
information about hedge funds.”45 Ultimately, the Commission
concluded that hedge fund advisers should be required to register under
the Advisers Act.46
C. The Look-Through Rule
Most advisers relied on the “de minimis” exemption from
registration available for investment advisers with fourteen or fewer
clients. Under the Commission rules, each individual fund counted as
one client. This meant that for purposes of the “de minimis” exemption,
a fund with fourteen or more underlying investors was still eligible for
the exemption, because those individual investors (for purposes of the
rule) were counted as just one client.47 However, given the
Commission’s recognition of the rise in hedge funds, and the potential
implications of such an increase,, the Commission adopted a rule
2011 and represents a three percent increase from the prior six-month period); see also,
Cassell Bryan-Low, Hedge Funds Look to Rebound, Inward Flows Are Seen Topping
Outward Flows for First Time Since 2007, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704588404575123580718646568.htl
(“Industry assets stood at $1.6 trillion at the end of 2009, up from $1.4 trillion in 2008,
though below the 2007 peak of $1.9 trillion, according to Chicago data tracker Hedge Fund
Research Inc.”).
43
Tony Griffiths, Assets hit all-time high, HFMWEEK.COM (May 25, 2011),
http://www.hfmweek.com/news/1666632/assets-hit-alltime-high.thtml (quoting William
Keunen, global director of Citco Fund Services, the industry’s largest administration firm).
44
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supra note 29; see also, William K.
Sjostrom Jr., A Brief History of Hedge Fund Adviser Registration and Its Consequences for
Private Equity and Venture Capital Advisers, HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE (2011),
available at
http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Sjostrom_Online_Article3.pdf.
45
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supra note 29.
46
Sjostrom, supra note 44.
47
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, supra note 29.
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requiring investment advisers of hedge funds to “look-through” the fund
and count as clients the fund’s individual investors for purposes of the
fifteen-client threshold.48 As a result, most hedge fund advisers were no
longer able to rely on the “private adviser” exemption, thereby forcing
them to register with the Commission.49 The “look-through” rule,
narrowly approved by a 3-2 vote on December 2, 2004, went into effect
on February 1, 2006, but was short-lived.50 In June 2006, a federal
appeals court held, in Goldstein v. S.E.C.,51 that the rule exceeded the
Commission’s rule-making authority and was thus invalid.52 Once
again, hedge fund advisers were able to rely on the “private adviser”
exemption from registration. This was the first of many attempts by
regulatory authorities to increase hedge fund transparency. Shortly after
the decision in Goldstein, Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA)53
introduced a bill giving the Commission express authority to adopt a
“look-through” rule.54 However, this attempt at hedge fund regulation
also proved futile, as the bill stalled out in committee. 55 A similar bill
introduced the following year was likewise unsuccessful. 56
D. Title IV
In the wake of the financial crisis, Congressional desire to require
hedge funds to register under the Advisers Act was revived; as a result,
Dodd-Frank included a hedge fund adviser registration provision.57 In
contrast to prior attempts at regulation, instead of adopting, or
authorizing the Commission to adopt, a “look-through” rule, Title IV
48

Sjostrom, supra note 44.
Id. See also, SEC Adopts Requirements that Hedge Fund Advisers Register Under
Investment
Advisers
Act,
LOWENSTEIN
SANDLER
PC
(Nov.
2004),
http://www.lowenstein.com/files/Publication/c5a19f0d-0888-4684-898b2c4333d55da1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2ac29b9e-3a52-46a9-8297579862798ab5/Investment%20Management%2011-04.pdf.
50
Id. See also, Investment Management Group Alert: Court Vacates SEC Rule
Requiring Hedge Funds to Register, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC (June 2006),
http://www.lowenstein.com/files/Publication/1955a703-3138-4e7b-8b1b017df55c616c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1e35596c-aac4-4964-8e400204bf32344f/Investment%20Management%2006-06.pdf.
51
Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
52
Sjostrom, supra note 44.
53
The most recent legislation’s namesake, along with Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT).
54
Sjostrom, supra note 44.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
49
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completely eliminated the “private adviser” exemption from the
Advisers Act.58 Specifically, Title IV repealed section 203(b)(3) of the
Advisers Act. The primary purpose of Congress in repealing section
203(b)(3) was to require advisers to “private funds,” who had
previously been considered exempt from registration, to register under
the Advisers Act.59
By promulgating Title IV under Dodd-Frank, Congress adopted
changes to the Advisers Act, with the intent of increasing the
probability that managers of private funds, including hedge funds,
private equity funds, and other types of pooled investment vehicles,
would be required to register with the Commission as investment
advisers.60 Commission Chairman Mary L. Shapiro stated, “[t]hese rules
will fill a key gap in the regulatory landscape. . .[i]n particular, our
proposal will give the Commission, and the public, insight into hedge
fund and other private fund managers who previously conducted their
work under the radar and outside the vision of regulators.”61 By
eliminating the “private adviser” exemption, Title IV seeks to fulfill one
of the key provisos of Dodd Frank’s “overarching mandate to limit
systemic risk.”62 Title IV aims to bring hedge funds under the purview
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council,63 which maintains the
authority to call upon financial services firms on a case-by-case basis to
58

Id.
Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R.,
pt. 275, Rel. No. IA-3221, 15 U.S.C. § 80b, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia3221.pdf.
60
Susan Alker, Dodd-Frank Changes the Game for Hedge Funds and PE Funds,
LENDING
LAW
REPORT
(Aug.
13,
2010),
http://www.lendinglawreport.com/2010/08/articles/regulation/doddfrank-changes-the-gamefor-hedge-funds-and-pe-funds/ (while it has been covered as “hedge fund registration”
requirements, in actuality “the amendments primarily affect the status of the fund managers,
rather than the funds themselves.”).
61
Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 4.
62
Dodd Frank Changes Next to Nothing, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2010),
http://www.hedgefundmarketing.org/dodd-frank-changes-nothing.
63
Hedge Funds and Dodd-Frank Reform, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N (last visited Feb.
18, 2012), https://www.managedfunds.org/issues-policy/issues/hedge-funds-and-doddfrank-reform. The Council was created to monitor and maintain the stability of the United
States financial system and to facilitate coordination and information sharing among
regulatory agencies. Additionally, the Council consists of 10 voting members and five
nonvoting members, bringing together the expertise of federal financial regulators, state
regulators, and an insurance expert appointed by the President. Financial Stability Oversight
Council,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
TREASURY
(last
visited
Feb.
18,
2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/default.aspx.
59
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either: (i) “increase the frequency and detail of its reporting,” or (ii)
“firm up its capital reserves.”64
II. THE PRIVATE FUND INVESTMENT ADVISERS
REGISTRATION ACT OF 2010
A. Registration Requirements
Title IV will now require those advisers who are no longer
permitted to avail themselves of the “private adviser” exemption, and do
not qualify for one of the newly created “narrower” exemptions, to
register with the Commission under the Advisers Act. Accordingly,
these advisers will be required to maintain records and any other
information that the Commission deems “necessary and appropriate to
avoid systemic risk.”65 “Risk-related information includes trading and
investment positions, trading practices, the amount of assets under
management, the use of leverage, including off-balance sheet leverage,
counterparty credit risk exposure, valuation policies, and side letters.”66
Dodd-Frank also requires registered investment advisers to “adopt both
a written code of ethics that complies with federal securities laws” and
“written policies to prevent insider trading.”67 Lastly, “registered
investment advisers are required to maintain financial and other
business-related books and records, which facilitates inspections” by the
Commission.68 The Commission implemented a “transitional exemption
period so that private advisers, including hedge fund and private equity
fund advisers” not previously required to register, “[did] not have to do
so until March 30, 2012.”69
Another significant change under Title IV will come in the form of
increased state supervision, as the Act raised the assets under
management “threshold for federal regulation of investment advisers.”70
Previously, non-exempt investment advisers that managed more than
$25 million in assets had the option of registering with the Commission,
64

Dodd Frank Changes Next to Nothing, supra note 62.
Kaal, supra note 1, at 418.
66
Id.
67
Id. (citing Dodd-Frank Act, §404, 124 Stat. at 1571-73) (requiring investment
advisers to make disclosures to the Commission to protect investors and the “integrity of the
markets.”).
68
Kaal, supra note 1, at 418.
69
Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 4.
70
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 10.
65
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instead of with the state in which they had their primary place of
business.71 However, under Title IV, investment advisers who manage
between $25 million and $100 million in assets, known as “mid-sized”
investment advisers, will now be required to register with the state, as
opposed to the Commission.72 This will significantly increase the
number of advisers under state supervision. The Commission claimed
that this would “allow [it] to focus its resources on newly registered
hedge funds.”73 As discussed in greater detail below, private fund
advisers with less than $150 million in assets under management will
also be exempt from registration with the Commission, along with the
other four classes of exempt investment advisers.74
B. Key Exemptions
While Dodd-Frank removed the broad “private adviser”
exemption, it simultaneously created five new, narrow exemptions from
registration under the Advisers Act.75 The narrow exemptions from
registration under Title IV are: “(i) commodity trading advisers
(“CTAs”) registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) and that provide advice to a private fund” (so long as the advice
provided is not predominantly securities-related); (ii) “advisers to small
business investment companies that are licensees under the Small
Business Investment Act,”76 who have received notices to proceed to
qualify as a small business investment company, or certain other
affiliated person; and (iii) foreign private advisers. 77 The foreign private
adviser exemption has only very limited application and applies to
money managers who: (i) have “no place of business in the United
States”; (ii) have fewer than fifteen clients in the United States (either
directly or through a private fund managed by the investment adviser);

71

Investment Management Practice, Dodd-Frank Changes to Investment Adviser
Regulation,
MONTGOMERY
MCCRACKEN
(Oct.
18,
2010),
http://www.mmwr.com/home/publications/default.aspx?d=2889.
72
Id. (for investment advisers who would have to register in 15 or more individual
states, they may have the option to register with the Commission even though their AUM is
greater than $100 million).
73
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 10.
74
Kaal, supra note 1, at 400.
75
Investment Management Practice, supra note 71.
76
Id.
77
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(30) (providing an exemption
for certain foreign private advisers who meet criteria set forth in the section).
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(iii) have assets under management attributable to clients in the United
States of less than $25 million; and (iv) do not generally hold
themselves out in the United States as investment advisers and are not
an investment adviser to a registered investment company or business
development company.78 Additionally, this exclusion can be used for
offshore hedge fund managers.79
Two additional narrow exemptions under Title IV are available for:
(i) venture capital fund advisers,80 and (ii) family offices.81 Skeptical
industry professionals have scrutinized these two exemptions, leaving
many wondering if the two will effectively swallow the rule. 82 A valid
argument may be made that the exception does in fact swallow the rule,
leaving a lot less to Title IV than meets the eye. “Particularly troubling
is the family office exemption, which has the potential to turn into a
loophole that encompasses a large fraction of the industry.”83
III. TWO TROUBLING LOOPHOLES – THE VENTURE CAPITAL
FUND ADVISERS AND FAMILY OFFICE EXEMPTIONS
A. Venture Capital Fund Advisers
Under Section 203(1)-1, the Commission approved a new
definition of “venture capital fund,” designed to clearly and legally
distinguish such vehicles from other types of private funds, such as
hedge funds and private equity funds.84 The rule also seeks to address
Congressional concerns regarding the potential for systemic risk.85
78

Id. See also, Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 4.
Clients & Friends Memo: Hedge Fund Regulation Under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM, & TAFT LLP
(July 20, 2010), http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/072010_DF5.pdf.
80
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. 80b-3(k)(3) (exempting advisers
solely to “venture capital funds,” as defined; advisers to “venture capital funds” are exempt
from full registration (emphasis added), however, “venture capital funds” may still be
subjected to reporting and recordkeeping by the Commission).
81
Investment Management Practice, supra note 71.
82
See Kaal, supra note 1, at 419 (citing 156 CONG. REC. S5915 (daily ed. July 15,
2010) (statement of Sen. Jack Reed)(expressing concern for the “carve-outs” in the DoddFrank bill for venture capital)); see also 156 Cong. Rec. S5239 (daily ed. June 30, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski) (outlining concerns with several of the exemptions).
83
Brown, Lynch, & Petajisto, supra note 21.
84
Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less
Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, 75 Fed.
Reg. 77190 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010), to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275.
85
Id.
79
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However, the opportunity for overlap is greater than one might
anticipate.
In summary, the rule defines a ‘venture capital fund’ as a private
fund that: (i) holds no more than twenty percent of the fund’s capital
commitments in non-qualifying investments (other than short-term
holdings); (ii) “does not borrow or otherwise incur leverage, other than
short-term borrowing; (iii) “does not offer its investors redemption or
other similar liquidity rights except in extraordinary circumstances; (iv)
represents itself as pursuing a venture capital strategy to its investors
and prospective investors; and (v) is not registered under the Company
Act and has not elected to be treated as a business development
company. . .86
In defining a venture capital fund to “include a fund that invests a
portion of its capital in investments that would not otherwise satisfy all
elements of the rule (the ‘non-qualifying basket’),” the Commission
sought to balance its desire to differentiate between a venture capital
fund and other types of private funds, with competing considerations of
managers who wanted greater flexibility to exercise investment
discretion.87 “While the definition limits the amount of non-qualifying
investments, it allows the adviser to choose how to allocate those
investments.”88
While “setting the level for non-qualifying investments at a
sufficiently low threshold would preclude advisers of other types of
private funds from relying on the venture capital exemption,” setting the
threshold too high may allow for the inclusion of many advisers to other
types of private funds.89 In setting this level, however, the Commission
did not “receive specific empirical analysis regarding the venture capital
industry as a whole” that might assist in determining “the appropriate
size of the basket.”90
This is troubling because by including a twenty percent basket,
firms may employ hybrid strategies and still fall under the “narrow”
86

Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less
Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. IA-3222, 17 CFR pt. 275 (2011). (“Qualifying investments”
generally consist of equity securities of “qualifying portfolio companies” that are directly
acquired by the fund).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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Title IV exemptions for venture capital fund advisers. If the purported
purpose of Title IV is to fill a regulatory gap and limit systemic risk by
increasing regulatory oversight, this opportunity to create a hybrid
strategy may be one significant way to skirt the regulatory requirements
of Title IV. This twenty percent basket of non-qualifying assets may
have significant systemic market risk, given the size of the overall fund.
Said percentage of the market will be unregulated and may also allow
other private investors to take advantage of the exemption. One such
investment adviser who employs a hybrid strategy is Michael Stark of
Crosslink Capital Inc., who manages $2.15 billion in assets.91 Stark
attempts to profit from a hybrid strategy of providing venture funding
for private companies and hedge fund investments to profit from public
ones.92 Such a business model allows “the firm to double its bets when
it perceives good opportunities.”93
B. Family Offices
In recognition of Dodd-Frank’s repeal of the “private adviser”
exemption, upon which many family offices previously relied, section
202(a)(11)(G) explicitly exempts family offices from the definition of
investment advisers who may be subject to the Advisers Act. 94 A
“family office” is defined as any company,95 “including its directors,
partners, trustees, and employees acting within the scope of their
employment,” that: (i) “has no clients other than ‘family clients’”; (ii) is
wholly owned and controlled96 (directly or indirectly) by “family
members”; and (iii) “does not hold itself out to the public as an

91

Kambiz Foroohar, A VC Who Runs a Hedge Fund: Michael Stark’s Crosslink
Capital is Unleashing its Unusual Combination of Venture Funding and Stock Picking to
Profit from Technology Hits, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Nov. 2011, at 98.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (2011); see Dodd-Frank
Act § 409.
95
“Company” for purposes of rule 202 means “a corporation, a partnership, an
association, a joint-stock company, a trust or any organized group of persons, whether
incorporated or not; or any receiver, trustee in a case under Title 11, or similar official, or
any liquidating agent for any of the foregoing, in his capacity as such.” 15 U.S.C. §80b2(a)(5) (2010).
96
“Control” for purposes of rule 202 means “the power to exercise a controlling
influence over the management or policies of a company, unless such power is solely the
result of being an officer of such company.” 17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(1).
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investment adviser.”97 The Commission concluded that ownership and
control by family members ensures that the family is in a position to
protect its interest, and is therefore less likely to need the protections of
the federal securities laws.98
Therefore, the relief granted in Section 202(a)(11)(G) is premised
on two separate grounds. First, “the family adviser [is not] within the
intent of the ‘investment adviser’ definition under the Advisers Act.” 99
Second, the “primary purpose of regulation under the Advisers Act. . . is
to protect the public from fraudulent and unscrupulous asset
managers.”100 Moreover, the “family office” exemption was included
based on the philosophy that the Commission “should not be involved
in policing financial disputes among family members or regulating
people managing their own money.”101
The family office rule purports to narrowly circumscribe the class
of relatives who are permissible “family clients” or owner-controllers of
the family office.102 “Family clients” include any: (i) “family member
or, subject to certain conditions, former family member;” (ii) “charitable
foundation, charitable organization or charitable trust established and
funded exclusively by one or more family members or former family
members;” (iii) “trust or estate existing for the sole current benefit of
one or more family clients;” (iv) “entity wholly owned and controlled
(directly or indirectly) exclusively by, and operated for the sole benefit
of, one or more family clients;”103 or (v) “key employee or, subject to

97

17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(b) (holding itself out to the public as an investment
adviser suggests that the family office is seeking to enter into typical advisory relationships
with non-family clients, and thus is inconsistent with the adoption of this rule.)
98
Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (2011).
99
Lawrence D. Frishman & Anastasia T. Rokas, SEC Proposes Rule Defining “Family
Office” Exclusion From Definition of Investment Adviser, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER,
&
FLOM
LLP
&
AFFILIATES
(Oct.
27,
2010),
http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=2271.
100
Id.
101
Sarah N. Lynch, Senator Shelby says Soros hypocrite for reforms dodge, THOMSON
REUTERS (July 28, 2011, 9:47 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/07/28/idINIndia58490620110728.
102
Frishman & Rokas, supra note 99 (for example, the proposed family office rule
excludes from the class of permissible relatives aunts, uncles, cousins and stepparents, and
their spouses and siblings).
103
Id. (Any such entity that is a pooled investment vehicle must be excepted from the
definition of “investment company” under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§§80a-1 to -64 (the ‘Investment Company Act’ (internal citations omitted))
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certain conditions, former key employee.”“104
The key concept in the family client definition is the term “family
members,”105 which will include “all lineal descendants of a common
ancestor (who may be living or deceased) as well as current and former
spouses or spousal equivalents of those descendants, provided that the
“ancestor is no more than ten generations removed from the youngest
generation of family members.”106 Under this construction, “the family
office will be able to choose the common ancestor and may change [the]
designation over time such that the family office clientele is able to shift
over time along with the family members served by the family
office.”107 “To prevent families from choosing an extremely remote
ancestor, which could allow commercial advisory businesses to rely on
the rule, [the Commission] impos[ed] a ten-generation limit between the
oldest and youngest generation of family members.”108 The term also
encompasses all children by adoption, current and former stepchildren,
foster children, and persons who were minors when another family
member became their legal guardian.109 The adopted definition of
“family member”110 is far broader than the Commission initially

104

Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act, 17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(b). “If a
person that is not a family client becomes a client of the family office as a result of [an]
involuntary transfer from a family member or key employee” (i.e. a bequest to a friend, of
assets in a family office-advised private fund) that person will be deemed a family client for
purposes of the rule for only one year following the involuntary transfer. This transition
period permits the family office to orderly transition that client’s assets to another
investment adviser or otherwise restructure its activities to comply with the Advisers Act
(via registration).
105
17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)(i).
106
Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act, 17 CFR pt. 275, (2011). In proposed rule
202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(2)(vi), and (d)(4) the Commission proposed permitting former family
members to retain any investments held through the family office at the time they became a
former family member, but to limit them from making any new investments through the
family offices.
107
Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act 17 CFR pt. 275, 9–10 (2011).
108
Id. (quoting Comment Letter of the American Bar Association, Section of Business Law
and Section of Real Property, Trust and Estate Law (Nov. 18, 2010)).
109
17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(6).
110
Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act 17 CFR pt. 275 (2011)(to be codified at
17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(5)). Proposed rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(5) defined the
term “family member” by reference to the “founder: or the family office, and generally to
include the founder’s spouse (or spousal equivalent), their parents, their lineal descendants,
and their siblings and their lineal descendants. Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. IA-3220, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (June 22, 2011)(now codified at 17 C.F.R.
§275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(5)).
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proposed. Such a limit will arguably serve to restrict the “scope of
persons considered family members while accommodating the typical
number of generations served by most family offices.”111
Other permitted “family clients” include “any non-profit
organization, charitable foundation, charitable trust (including
charitable lead trusts and charitable remainder trusts whose only current
beneficiaries are other family clients and charitable or non-profit
organizations), or other charitable organization,” all funded exclusively
by one or more other family clients.112 In an effort to accommodate
estate planning and charitable giving plans, the Commission included
certain family trusts established for testamentary and charitable
purposes as “family clients.”113 Irrevocable trusts “in which one or more
other family clients are the only current beneficiary,”114 “revocable
trusts of which one or more family client is the sole grantor,”115 and an
estate of a “family member, former family member, key employee or. . .
former key employee,” will also be treated as “family clients.”116
Finally, the Commission included “key employees” among the list
of permissible family clients to whom the family office is permitted to
provide investment advice.117 “Key employees” for purposes of the rule
include any natural person (including any key employee’s spouse or
spousal equivalent who holds a joint, community property or other
similar shared ownership interest with that key employee), who is: (i) an

111

Id. at 9-10.
112
Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (2011) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)(v); proposed rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(2)(iii) included
requirement that charities be established and funded “by family members,” however in its
final form, the Commission changed that requirement to “by family clients” as family
charities are often established and funded by family trusts, corporations or estates, and not
exclusively family members.
113
Id.
114
Id. The rule also permits the family office to advise irrevocable trusts funded
exclusively by one or more other family clients in which only current beneficiaries, in
addition to other family clients, are non-profit organizations, charitable foundations,
charitable trusts, or other charitable organizations.
115
17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)(ix) (2011). Accordingly, a revocable trust
may be advised by a family office relying on the rule regardless of whether the beneficiaries
of the trust are family members.
116
17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)(vi) (2011). For former key employees, the
advice is subject to the condition contained in rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)(iv). This
effectively permits a family office to advise the executor of a family member’s estate even if
that estate will be distributed to (and thus be for the benefit of) non-family members.
117
Id.
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executive officer, director, trustee, general partner, or person serving in
a similar capacity at the family office or its affiliated family office, 118 or
(ii) any other employee of the family office or its affiliated family office
(other than an employee performing solely clerical, secretarial, or
administrative functions), who, in connection with his or her regular
functions or duties, participates in the investment activities of the family
office.119
“To qualify for key employee status, the individual must have been
performing such functions and duties…for at least 12 months.”120 “In
addition to receiving direct advice from the family office, key
employees (because they are ‘family clients’) may indirectly receive
investment advice through the family office by their investment in
family office-advised private funds, charitable organizations, and other
family entities.”121
IV. HOW WILL TITLE IV AFFECT THE HEDGE FUND
INDUSTRY?
A. Potential Implications of the Family Office Exemption on
Private Fund Investment Advisers.
Title IV’s family office exemption may create a significant
regulatory loophole in a number of ways. First, in defining what
constitutes a “family office” the Commission included a broad
definition of “family member” that not only signals a certain level of
leniency, but also a relatively expansive limit. Additionally, section
202(a)(11)(G)-1, makes no reference to which individual the common
ancestor is, nor does it specify that it always has to remain the same

118

17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(8) (2011) “Affiliated family office” is defined
as “a family office wholly owned by family clients of another family office and that is
controlled (directly or indirectly) by one or more family members of such other family
office and/or family entities affiliated with such other family office and has no clients other
than family clients of such other family office.” The rationale is that those key employees
qualifying as knowledgeable employees of an affiliated family office, should be in a
position to protect themselves in receiving investment advice from a family office excluded
from registration under the Advisers Act. Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. IA-3220, 17 CFR pt. 275, (June 22, 2011)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(1)).
119
17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(8) (2011).
120
Frishman and Rokas, supra note 99.
121
Family Offices, Investment Advisers Act, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, 23–24 (2011).
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common ancestor.122 This effectively allows the family office to serve
later generations that would otherwise extend beyond the ten-generation
limit by simply re-designating the family office’s common ancestor.123
Also, ten generations is far-reaching and this too presents the possibility
for an additional loophole. It may be safe to suspect that most
Americans are completely unaware of who their ancestors are ten
generations back. At that level of generality, it may very well be that a
large group could point to a single, common ancestor. This expansive
generational-limit, coupled with the re-designation allowance, may
avow the family office exemption to swallow the rule.
Second, hedge funds may restructure their funds by returning
assets from outside investors who would not qualify as a “family
client.” Arguably in anticipation of the implementation of Title IV and
the associated registration with the Commission, several prominent
hedge fund managers have already begun to do so, thus availing
themselves of the “family office” exemption. For example, George
Soros, hedge fund manager at Soros Fund Management LLC,
announced that he would end hedge fund management for clients who
are not family members.124 As a result, Soros will return $1 billion to
these external, non-familial investors. In effect, he is “kicking out longtime investors,” which will allow him to remain exempt under Title
IV.125 In forfeiting $1 billion to avoid regulation, Soros Fund
Management’s Quantum Group of Funds will still retain $25 billion in
internal, familial assets under management.126 If the purported purpose
of Title IV is to increase transparency and monitor systemic risk, does
the $25 billion pose any less of a risk simply because it is classified as a
“family office”? In that context, $1 billion forfeited in exchange for $25
billion of assets under management outside the regulatory oversight of
122

Id.
Id. at 10.
124
Lonely Conservative, George Soros Dumping Hedge Funds to Avoid Dodd-Frank
Rules,
LONELYCONSERVATIVE.COM
(July
26,
2011),
http://lonelyconservative.com/2011/07/george-soros-dumping-hedge-funds-to-avoid-doddfrank-rules/.
125
Duff McDonald, Why George Soros should be regulated, even now, CNN MONEY
(July 27, 2011, 3:16 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/07/27/why-george-sorosshould-be-regulated-even-now/.
126
Lonely Conservative, supra note 124; see also Bess Levin, George Soros Returning
All Outside Investor Money, Keeping It In The Fam, DEALBREAKER (July 26, 2011),
http://dealbreaker.com/2011/07/george-soros-returning-all-outside-investor-money-keepingit-in-the-fam/.
123
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the Commission may be a small sacrifice to make.
Influential Republican Senator Richard Shelby publicly scolded
Soros for evading the new hedge fund regulations he had once publicly
backed.127 Soros is a staunch Democratic Party supporter who had
testified before Congress in 2008, stating that “[t]he entire regulatory
framework needs to be reconsidered, and hedge funds need to be
regulated within that framework.”128 When pressed by lawmakers,
“Soros said he believed some hedge funds pose systemic risk and
should be required to report additional information to regulators.”129
Congress seemed to agree with Soros’s sentiments when they
promulgated Title IV and thereby called for increased transparency in
the hedge fund industry in an effort to monitor systemic risk.
That said, “don’t be surprised to see his fellow Wall Street
financiers follow suit. They’ll use their. . .legal muscle to sidestep
Dodd-Frank. . .”130 Soros has been joined by a “growing list of fund
managers who have recently revamped their businesses in the face of”
Title IV.131 In March of 2011, prominent investor and influential hedge
fund manager, Carl C. Icahn, announced that he also had plans to
discontinue the management of money for outsiders.132 In a letter to
investors, Icahn cited “a reluctance to be responsible to investors should
another financial crisis erupt;” however, similar to Soros, he will
continue to manage a “family office.”133 Icahn will return nearly a
quarter of the overall assets he manages, which comprise roughly $1.76
billion of the $7 billion currently managed by Icahn Capital.134 Fellow
hedge fund manager Stanley Druckenmiller of Duquesne Capital
Management will also create a “family office,” where he will continue
to oversee nearly $12 billion.135 With the passing of Title IV’s
127

Lynch, supra note 101.
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Katie Benner, Carl Icahn closes hedge fund to outside investors, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 8, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/03/08/carl-icahn-calls-itquits/.
133
Azam Ahmed & Michael J. De La Merced, Icahn to Return Outside Money in
Hedge
Fund,
N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(Mar.
8,
2011,
8:34
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/icahn-to-retun-outside-money-in-hedge-fund/; see
also Benner supra note 132.
134
Id.
135
Katherine Burton, Billionaire Stanley Druckenmiller to shut down Duquesne hedge
128
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compliance date, this trend has only continued. In September of 2012,
William Collins, manager of Brencourt Advisors LLC, a multistrategy
hedge fund with $300 million in assets under management, announced
that he too would be returning money to outside investors. 136 While
Brencourt Advisors had previously managed more than $2 billion,
Collins has decided to convert his firm into a family office in 2013.137
Third, “family advisers that fail to satisfy the conditions of the
proposed rule may still seek an exemptive order” from the Commission,
thereby skirting registration requirements.138 It is unclear on which
grounds the Commission will grant these exemptive orders. However,
the Commission has “expressly recognized the privacy concerns of
family advisers.”139 Additionally, the Advisers Act is not designed to
regulate the interactions of family members, and registration would
unnecessarily intrude on the privacy of the family involved.140 The
allowance of exemptive orders to protect the privacy of the family
involved, if applied too loosely, also has the potential to swallow the
rule.
B. Is it all Smoke and Mirrors? What are the Real
Implications?
While Title IV requires all eligible private fund advisers to register
with the Commission, “maintain extensive records about their
investment and business practices and provide this information to the
SEC, hire a chief compliance officer to design and monitor a
compliance program, and be subject to periodic SEC examinations and
inspections,”141 one may wonder what difference this will make. While
unregistered hedge funds are not required to make any disclosures, they
are still subject to common law fraud standards. Additionally, the
Commission adopted an antifraud rule (following the invalidity of the
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aforementioned registration rule) for all investment advisers. 142 Rule
206(4)-8(a)(1) prohibits investment advisers, including those advising
hedge funds, from making
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made. . .to any
investor or prospective investor. . .or omitting to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, to any investor or prospective investor in the
pooled investment vehicle.143
Even those hedge fund advisers who previously met the “private
adviser” exemption under the Advisers Act typically provided potential
“hedge fund investors with a private placement memorandum that
disclos[ed] information about the investment strategies the hedge fund
[was] permitted to use and an overview of how the hedge fund
operat[ed].”144 Additionally, hedge fund investors generally received
some “ongoing performance information, risk analyses and portfolio
profiles from their hedge fund advisers.”145 “Although not required,
most hedge funds retain an auditor to conduct an annual independent
audit.”146 This begs the question of how significant the changes will be,
especially considering the fact that many hedge fund advisers
previously offered information to their clients for the purported purpose
of increasing transparency.
Furthermore, and perhaps most noteworthy, is the fact that prior to
the passage of Dodd-Frank, the “majority of hedge funds based in the
United States” voluntarily registered with the Commission.147
Specifically, as of 2009, “almost 55 percent of the more than 2,000
United States-based hedge fund firms” were registered with the
Commission.148 “The registered universe of hedge funds represents

142

Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 17 C.F.R.
pt. 275 (2007).
143
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §206(4)-8(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §80b (2006).
144
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, Staff Report to the U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Jeff Benjamin, Bleeding assets, hedge funds register with SEC, INVESTMENT NEWS
(Feb.
2,
2009,
2:35
PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090202/REG/902029987.
148
Id.

ALBIEZ NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT AND TITLE IV

1/18/2013 2:00 PM

169

seventy-one percent of United States-based hedge fund assets.”149
Kenneth Heinz, president of Hedge Fund Research, Inc. stated in 2009,
that the rationale for registering with the Commission was difficult to
determine.150 “It’s tough to speculate on exactly why these firms are
registering beyond that they certainly feel it is beneficial to be able to
show clients they are registered.”151 One primary reason for this may be
the successful, albeit short-lived, passage of the 2006 hedge fund
regulation. Although Goldstein v. S.E.C. overturned the rule that
required hedge fund managers to register as investment advisers, many
hedge funds never de-registered. While Title IV has been touted as
sweeping regulation of the hedge fund industry, it seems that there may
be less to Title IV than meets the eye, in light of the fact that a large
majority of United States-based hedge fund firms and their assets
optionally registered already.
While the burden for oversight of “mid-sized” investment advisers
will shift from the Commission to the state, added responsibility for
larger investment advisers, coupled with reduction in workforce at the
Commission, raises reasonable concerns about how the Commission can
effectively regulate those investment advisers with assets under
management in excess of $150 million.152 “The Commission lacks the
resources necessary to conduct frequent, comprehensive hedge fund
adviser examinations.”153 Taken a step further, the Commission may not
have the resources to evaluate the data it receives involving dynamic
hedging strategies and trades.154 This highlights the fact that although
the purpose of Title IV is to monitor systemic risk through increased
transparency, the Commission and state agencies may not have the
necessary resources to effectively examine those who are registered,
thus leaving less to Title IV than meets the eye.
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Elisse Walter, the Democratic Securities and Exchange
Commission Commissioner voiced concern over this increased
responsibility. Commissioner Walter “pointed to a study the
Commission released in January” 2011, which showed that the average
fund manager can expect to be examined once every eleven years under
the existing system.155 Walter stated, “the SEC is not, and unless
significant changes are made, cannot fulfill its examination mandate
with respect to investment advisers.”156
Indeed, when Richard Ketchum, Chairman and CEO of the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, testified before the Committee
on Financial Services on the Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012,
he echoed Commissioner Walter’s concerns. Ketchum highlighted the
Commission’s findings that “only 8 percent of registered investment
advisers were examined in 2011 and approximately 38 percent of
advisers registered with the [Commission] have never been
examined.”157 Ketchum further estimated that regulators examine the
average Commission-registered investment adviser “only once every 10
to 13 years,” a more pessimistic estimate than Walter’s eleven-year
estimate.158 Additionally, he stated that the frequency of Commission
“examinations of investment advisers has decreased 50 percent since
2004.”159 According to the Commission’s January 2011 study, the entity
“will not have sufficient capacity in the near or long term to conduct
effective examinations of registered investment advisers with adequate
frequency.”160 If securities regulators are unable to examine newly
registered investment advisers, how will the investing public be
protected?
Ketchum correctly concluded that currently the Commission lacks
the requisite resources to effectively regulate these additional industry
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professionals.161 The study further acknowledged that new examination
responsibilities provided to the Commission under Dodd-Frank means
that an increase in agency examination staff “is unlikely to keep pace
with the growth of registered investment advisers.”162 The Commission
study estimated that it would need to “double the number of examiners
to increase the frequency of examinations even 20 percent.”163 That
said, the House Appropriations Committee, after considering the
Commission’s request for a $1.57 billion budget for fiscal year 2013,
allotted $1.37 billion to the Commission for fiscal year 2013, which is
$195 million less than President Obama had requested. Although this
figure represents a $245 million increase from fiscal year 2012’s
appropriations, it starves the Commission of “necessary funding to
boost oversight of advisers.”164 While Dodd-Frank’s shifting of
investment advisers to state regulation may result in a short-term
decrease in the number of advisers, “there will be an immediate increase
in assets under management ‘as larger and more complex entities enter
the Commission’s oversight.’”165 Further, as Commissioner Walter
noted, these advisers are “more likely to be assessed as higher-risk
advisers requiring more resources.”166
The “government’s desire to learn more about hedge funds, both to
assess systemic risk and to protect investors,” must also be weighed
against the compliance costs this imposes on funds and then
subsequently, investors.167 While compliance costs will be high, it
remains to be seen what substantial benefit this strict reporting
requirement will have on hedge fund managers newly registered as
investment advisers.168 Given Commissioner Walter’s forecast, it seems
that costly registration may result in insignificant benefits resultant from
proactively monitoring risk in the overall hedge fund industry. Any
solace obtained from the knowledge that a hedge fund or its investment
adviser is registered is misplaced by the fact that periodic inspections
161
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are not always foolproof. For example, R. Allen Stanford, a registered
investment adviser who was subject to periodic examinations by the
Commission, was convicted in June 2012 of swindling more than $7
billion from investors over a twenty-year period.169 On a larger scale,
the Commission inspected financier “Bernard Madoff’s operations
several times, and eventually required him to register as an investment
adviser.”170 Although he too was registered as an investment adviser,
the Commission never ascertained that Madoff was running an
unprecedented Ponzi scheme estimated to amount to $65 billion.171
In addition to federal regulation by the Commission, “mid-sized”
and smaller hedge funds will now fall under the purview of state
overseers. It is not clear that the states are ready for this responsibility.
The Commission “estimates that about 4,000 investment advisers will
switch to the states.”172 “Right now, as it is, the states don’t have the
budget or the manpower to even deal with the advisers that they have. . .
You’re lucky if the states [examine firms] on a three-year basis.”173 This
is particularly troublesome given that “[f]raud is more likely to happen
with small managers than big managers.”174 This issue is compounded
by the fact that several states, including Connecticut and California,
account for a disproportionately portion of the hedge-fund industry.
Connecticut expects that the number of investment advisers registered
in connection with Dodd-Frank will increase by thirty percent.175 Critics
of the increased state supervision also point to the resultant
administrative burden. As opposed to a uniform federal system, each
state may conceivably have its own rules and procedures for hedge
169
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funds to follow.176
As illuminated recently within the context of the insurance
industry, the lack of uniformity created by state-by-state regulation has
the potential for creating a problem wherein the industry lacks
perspective of the larger picture. Where “each state is responsible only
for its individual jurisdiction, no state can keep tabs on insurance
companies that cross state or international boundaries.”177 Proponents
for a uniform federal regulator point to the potential for systemic blind
spots in the insurance industry that jeopardize the capital markets and
national economy.178 This problem was highlighted by the failure of the
American International Group (AIG), a financial holding company
comprised of 209 subsidiaries, 71 of which were state-regulated
insurance entities.179 While AIG’s demise was brought on by
investments initiated by AIG’s financial products companies, it caused
many to question the state-based system. Not only does it have the
potential to create regulatory blind spots, but also, “some insurers have
become too complex and too interconnected world-wide for the limited
resources of state regulators to handle.”180 These same problems may
inevitably carry over to the hedge fund industry’s “mid-sized” and
smaller investment advisers, overseen by state regulators. Perhaps an
even more troubling aspect of the state-versus-federal debate is the fact
that many states do not currently have investment adviser laws,
registration requirements, or applicable programs in place.181
Finally, there is a risk that the information disclosed to the
Commission, including trading positions, trading strategies, and
dynamic hedging strategies, will not remain confidential. Potential
leakage could “undermine trading strategies and the long-term viability
of hedge funds.”182 This is concerning because hedge funds often
176
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provide markets and investors with substantial benefits including
enhanced liquidity, market efficiency, and an important risk
management tool.183 Leakage could also affect specific positions in the
market, including front running and potentially market-moving
positions.184
CONCLUSION
With the rulemaking power vested in them by Congress under Title
IV of Dodd-Frank, the Commission adopted new rules defining five
particular exemptions under the Advisers Act. While Title IV was
touted as highly anticipated, long-overdue regulation of the hedge fund
industry, there is far less to Title IV than meets the eye. Dodd-Frank
removed the broad “private adviser” exemption that many advisers
previously relied upon to avoid the regulatory and reporting eye of the
Commission, only to replace it with five more “narrow” exemptions. As
defined by the Commission, these exemptions begin to swallow the
rule. The “family office” exemption, in particular, may create a
loophole for the savvy hedge fund adviser. Given that other hedge fund
advisers have begun to cast away outside investors in order to meet one
of the newly designed exemptions to the Advisers Act, many of the
assets the Commission seeks to regulate will essentially remain
unregulated.
As the effective date for compliance with Title IV has now passed,
one might reasonably wonder whether Title IV will go far enough to
achieve Congress’s purported goals of increased transparency in an
effort to protect investors by monitoring systemic risk. Policy
arguments may be made in favor of more strict scrutiny of the hedge
fund industry, primarily because investors are demanding more
transparency185 and because private funds used to operate in the shadow
of the financial system, outside the regulatory control of the
Commission. However, the free-market crowd believes that overall
Dodd-Frank has gone too far, “strangling the lifeblood of market
capitalism.”186
183
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